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ALL FOR NOTHING?: EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
AND CONGRESSIONAL EVASION ON ARMS SALES
Margaret M. Murphy+
On August 17, 2018, CNN reported that Lockheed Martin manufactured a
bomb that killed dozens of Yemeni schoolchildren in Northern Yemen.1 Saudi
Arabia, a leader in the Coalition against the Houthi alliance in Yemen, purchased
the bomb through an arms deal the State Department sanctioned.2 Michael A.
Newton, writing for The American Bar Association’s Center for Human Rights
opined in 2017 that:
Given the prima facie evidence of wrongdoing by Saudi Arabia [in
the conflict in Yemen], continued sale of arms to Saudi Arabia—and
specifically of arms used in airstrikes—should not be presumed to be
permissible based on the terms of the A[rms Export Control Act]
and/or the F[oreign Assistance Act].3
In the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), Congress delegates to the
President the authority “to control the import and the export of defense articles.”4
While the Act espouses lofty goals for promoting peace and avoiding war, there
is a question as to the efficacy and validity of its requirements.5 In particular,
+
J.D., The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law, expected 2021; A.B., Bryn
Mawr College, 2012. The author would like to thank Geoffrey Watson for his generous and
thoughtful suggestions and guidance, her family for their unwavering support, and the Catholic
University Law Review for its careful work on this comment.
1. Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Ryan Browne, Barbara Arvanitidis & Laura SmithSpark, Bomb that Killed 40 Children in Yemen was Supplied by the US, CNN (Aug. 17, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/17/middleeast/us-saudi-yemen-bus-strike-intl/index.html.
2. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Yemen: Is the U.S. Breaking the Law?, 10 HARV. NAT’L
SEC. J. 1, 5 (2019). In 2011, under pressure in the wake of Arab Spring protests, Yemen’s
longstanding leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh, reluctantly stepped down after negotiating immunity for
himself with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Human Rights Council, Situation of Human
Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014, ANN. REP. OF THE U.N.
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. AND REPS. OF THE OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R AND THE SEC’YGEN. 1, 24 (Sept. 9–27, 2019), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/
A_HRC_42_CRP_1.pdf. [hereinafter Human Rights Council]. Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, Saleh’s
vice-president, thereafter prevailed in an uncontested election and assumed the presidency. Id. at
25. The Houthis, a Zaydi Shi’a armed alliance, were not satisfied with this arrangement, and in
early 2015, reached Sana’a, took control of the presidential palace, and placed Hadi and all his
senior officials under arrest. Id. at 2426. Hadi escaped to the south, and on March 24, 2015
requested that the GCC and League of Arab states intervene militarily. Id.
3. Michael A. Newton, An Assessment of the Legality of Arms Sales to the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia in the Context of the Conflict in Yemen, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. 1, 2223
(May 19, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/human_rights/
ABACHRAssessmentofArmsSalestoSaudiArabia.authcheckdam.pdf.
4. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2018).
5. See id.
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emergency waiver provisions authorizing the President to avoid the Act’s
specific oversight constraints6—together with Supreme Court jurisprudence
emphasizing executive authority7—complicates what appears to be a clear
constitutional issue.8
On May 24, 2019, President Trump invoked an emergency waiver provision
of the AECA—a clause that allows the President to waive Congressional
reporting and waiting periods—in order to sell precision-guided munitions to
Saudi Arabia and its coalition members worth approximately $8 billion.9
Ordinarily, the AECA requires that the President report to Congress on proposed
sales, and provide between fifteen and thirty calendar days for Congress to enact
a joint resolution disapproving the sale.10 However, the President can always
veto this joint resolution and proceed.11 One senator speculated the President
invoked the provision because “he kn[ew] Congress would disapprove of this
sale.”12 Indeed, Congress passed twenty-two joint resolutions opposing this
particular sale.13
Given that a War Powers Resolution directing the President to remove U.S.
troops from hostilities in Yemen garnered sufficient votes to pass both houses,
despite the fact that support for it could not override a presidential veto, it seems
possible congressional opposition to future Saudi arms sales could continue to
grow as well.14 If enough members of Congress are willing to make an issue out
of arms sales and override a presidential veto, would that matter?
6. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c)(2) (2018).
7. E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
9. See Scott R. Anderson, Untangling the Yemen Arms Sale Debate, LAWFARE (June 24,
2019, 1:10 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/untangling-yemen-arms-sales-debate.
10. See § 2776(b).
11. See Anderson, supra note 9.
12. Press Release, Chris Murphy, Murphy Statement on New Middle East Arms Sale, (May
24, 2019), https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/murphy-statement-on-newmiddle-east-arms-sale. At Congress’ request, the Office of the Inspector General at the State
Department delivered initial findings to Senior State Department Officials of an investigation into
the legality of the use of this provision in early March 2020. Interview of: Steve A. Linick: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 116th Cong. 29–31 (2020) (statement of Steve A. Linick,
former State Department Inspector General); Edward Wong & David E. Sanger, State Dept.
Investigator Fired by Trump had Examined Weapons Sales to Saudis and Emirates, N.Y. TIMES
(May 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics/pompeo-trump-linick-inspectorgeneral-firing.html. On May 15, 2020, President Trump ousted the Inspector General, Steve A.
Linick. Id.; Edward Wong, Michael LaForgia & Lara Jakes, Pompeo Aide who Pushed Saudi Arms
Sale Said to have Pressured Inspector General, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/us/politics/pompeo-inspector-general-saudi-arms.html. As
of June 2020, three congressional committees were investigating whether Linick’s firing was in
retaliation for inquiries into the Secretary of State he oversaw at that time, one of which concerned
the use of this emergency waiver provision. Id.
13. Anderson, supra note 9.
14. JEREMY M. SHARP & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RSCH SERV., R45046,
CONGRESS AND THE WAR IN YEMEN: OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION 2015-2019 811 (2019).
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Diverging from domestic affairs, it seems increasingly more common for the
President and Congress to employ devices other than those that the framers
memorialized in the Constitution to manage foreign affairs.15 For example,
Congress has not issued a declaration of war since World War II.16 Nevertheless,
courts and scholars have interpreted congressional authorizations of military
force—like the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) following the
September 11, 2001 attacks—to sanction the President to engage in war.17
Instead of entering into treaties with the advice and consent of the senate,
executive agreements, some of which are sole executive agreements, or those
that do not require the advice and consent of anyone except for the President,
have “become the primary instrument of international lawmaking in the United
States . . . [and] far surpass Article II treaties.”18 The phrase “Executive
Agreement” does not appear in the Constitution.19 At issue in the case of arms
sales is whether the rules Congress imposed in the AECA—namely its
requirement that the President notify Congress, wait for Congress to issue joint
resolutions in opposition, and halt sales if Congress overrides a President’s
veto—would actually prevent the President from selling arms.20
Congress enacted the AECA with the goal of achieving a “world which is free
from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which
the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in which
international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully.”21
Further, arms sales must be “consistent with the foreign policy interests of the
United States, the purposes of the foreign assistance program of the United
States, . . . the extent and character of the military requirement, and the economic

15. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the
Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 150 (2009).
16. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declaration of
War, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 89, 90 (2008) (“[I]t seems that no nation has issued [declarations of
war] since World War II.”).
17. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Cong. Authorization and the War on Terrorism,
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2060 (2005) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004)
(plurality opinion)).
18. Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note 15. For further criticism of sole executive
agreements, see Samuel Estreicher & Steven Menashi, Taking Steel Seizure Seriously: The Iran
Nuclear Agreement and the Separation of Powers, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 122627 (2017)
(“There is, . . . no basis for . . . a pattern of congressional acquiescence . . . creat[ing] a historical
gloss on the Constitution conferring authority on the President—by political agreement with foreign
states or other unilateral executive action—to disregard congressional policy . . . in the foreign
claims settlement arena or another foreign relations context.”).
19. See U.S. CONST. art I. Article I forbids states from entering into “Agreement[s] . . . with
a foreign Power.” See also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 40 (1990) (citing U.S. CONST. art I).
20. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(1) (2018).
21. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2018).
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and financial capability of the recipient country.”22 Are these requirements
meaningful?
Part I of this comment will identify and explore the Constitution’s grants of
foreign affairs powers to the various branches of government. It will then
analyze the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence dealing with these grants; most
notably, Justice Robert Jackson’s famed Steel Seizure concurrence that provided
a framework for reconciling balance of power between the Congress and the
executive.23 Part I will then explore an instance of arms sales past practice: the
Iran-Contra Affair. Part II sets out the arguments for and against the President’s
authority to sell arms over Congress’ opposition and analyzes the role of the
emergency waiver provisions. This section applies Justice Jackson’s Steel
Seizure framework to the question at hand.
Part III will suggest that the President does not possess the authority to sell
arms if Congress enacts a joint resolution and overrides a presidential veto
because the President’s authority is at its lowest, Congress has an affirmative
grant of authority over arms sales under the Constitution, and as it is much better
policy for Congress to check the President in this realm, and vice versa.
Nevertheless, Part III reflects on a larger pattern of imbalance in foreign affairs,
the complexity the emergency provisions create, and the consequences of
congressional delegation and avoidance. It recommends a solution to account
for constitutional uncertainty the emergency waiver provision creates.
I. PRIOR LAW
A. Foreign Affairs and War Powers Grants Under the Constitution
Article I of the United States Constitution grants upon Congress the authority
“[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to . . . provide for the
common Defence . . . of the United States;”24 “[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations[;]”25 “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization[;]”26 “[t]o
coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin[;]”27 “[t]o define
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences
against the Law of Nations;”28 “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and

22. Id.
23. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–39 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
25. Id. For a discussion of the Foreign Commerce Clause’s original purpose and scope, see
Scott Sullivan, The Future of the Foreign Commerce Clause, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1959
(2015) (noting that, despite the fact that it has received little attention compared to the interstate
commerce clause, the framers viewed the foreign commerce clause as vital for competing
economically with Britain).
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;”29 “[t]o raise
and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to the Use shall be for a
longer Term than two Years;”30 “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy;”31 “[t]o
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;”32
‘[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;”33 and “[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”34 In keeping with its separation
of powers goals, the Constitution did not vest Congress with supreme authority
in foreign affairs.
Instead, Article II vests the President with “[t]he executive Power.”35 It
further provides that he “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, . . . and he shall have
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
except . . . Impeachment.”36 The President also possesses authority “by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,”37 to “receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers,”38 and “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”39
B. The Seesaw of U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the issue was whether an
export company could be indicted based on a joint resolution of Congress
delegating to the President the authority to declare certain arms sales unlawful.40
After first explaining that the matter at hand concerned foreign affairs as
opposed to domestic, the Court stressed that the nature and character of these
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
36. Id. at § 2. While scholars debate the exact meaning of this power, it is well accepted that
the phrase conferred “discretion for defensive actions,” meaning that the President had the authority
to thwart an attack on U.S. borders. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 249–50 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that part of the rationale for
selecting the word “declare” as opposed to “make” war in Article I was to give the President this
authority in case Congress was not swiftly able to declare war).
37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
38. Id. at § 3.
39. Id.
40. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 31415 (1936).
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foreign affairs powers are fundamental[ly] different than domestic affairs.41 The
Court further explained that the concept of a federal government of limited
enumerated powers applies only to domestic authority, and not to foreign affairs
powers.42 The differentiation in powers between domestic authority and foreign
affairs exists because the federal government assumed the authority of individual
states with respect to domestic affairs,43 but inherited foreign affairs authority
from the colonies “in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States
of America.”44 Therefore the Union, and not individual states under the Articles
of Confederation “was the sole possessor of external sovereignty.”45 The Court
reasoned that the United States is a sovereign nation, and its national government
must possess the same authority to act as any other sovereign would.46
Concluding that the Congress could delegate authority to the President in the
area of foreign affairs, the Court remarked, “the investment of the federal
government with the power of external sovereignty did not depend upon the
affirmative grants of the Constitution.”47
In dicta, the Court addressed the President’s specific authority in the foreign
affairs realm.48 Pronouncing that “the President alone has the power to speak or
listen as a representative of the nation,” the Court nullified Congress’ role in
foreign affairs by focusing on the President’s power to negotiate treaties.49
Indeed, the Court described Congress as “powerless” to interfere with treaty
negotiation, and quoted Chief Justice Marshall’s statement that “[t]he President
is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,” a persona he does not

41. Id. at 315.
42. Id. at 31516.
43. Id. at 316.
44. Id. The Court stated, “[a] political society cannot endure without a supreme will
somewhere. Sovereignty is never held in suspense.” Id. at 316–17.
45. Id. at 317.
46. Id. Contra THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 357 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001) (making clear the President’s authority extends to “supreme command
and direction of the military and naval forces, . . . while that of the British king extends to the
declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitution
under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.”).
47. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318–20. If this is indeed the case, it begs the question why
the Framers drafted the Constitution in the first place.
48. See id. at 31920.
49. Id. at 319. These particular statements have received much criticism. Harold Hongju
Koh stated the following:
[T]he opinion contains important words of limitation. By saying that ‘the President alone
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation,’ Justice Sutherland
could be read as recognizing only the well-established exclusive presidential power to
negotiate, and not a novel executive power to conclude agreements, on behalf of the
United States.
KOH, supra note 19, at 94. See also Louis Fisher, The Staying Power of Erroneous Dicta: From
Curtiss-Wright to Zivotofsky, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 19499 (2016) (highlighting fifty years
of criticism that scholars have levied against Justice Sutherland and Curtiss-Wright).
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claim through an act of Congress.50 Citing President Washington’s early
statement that “[t]he nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their
success must often depend on secrecy,”51 the Court concluded that the President,
not Congress, is better equipped to make and execute foreign policy.52
While the dispute in Curtiss-Wright did not compel the Court to decide
whether the President or Congress had greater authority when they disagreed,
this question did reach the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.53
The issue in Youngstown concerned whether it was constitutional for President
Truman to direct the Secretary of Commerce to seize steel mills in the midst of
a labor dispute during the Korean war.54 The majority rejected President
Truman’s argument that authority to seize the steel mills in order to evade a steel
shortage in wartime was inherent in his Commander in Chief power under the
Constitution, or in his executive vesting power.55 Instead, the majority reasoned
that the authority must come from either an act of Congress, or from a specific
provision of the Constitution.56 Because Congress had specifically rejected an
amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act that would have allowed the President to
seize the mills in the case of an emergency, the majority looked to authority in
the Constitution, and concluded that it did not exist.57 As the majority noted,
“the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the
idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”58
In his Youngstown concurrence, Justice Jackson focused his analysis on the
relationship between the President’s action and the will of Congress, noting,
“[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”59 Justice Jackson set out the
following three categories, now referred to as the Steel Seizure Framework, to
organize presidential authority along a spectrum:

50. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 31921 (citation omitted). For an analysis of Justice
Marshall’s purpose in making this statement, and for criticism of Curtiss-Wright, see Fisher, The
Staying Power, supra, note 49, at 150 (“In fact, the purpose of Marshall’s speech was to defend
President John Adams for carrying out a treaty provision. Nothing in Marshall’s sole-organ speech
promoted or advocated independent presidential authority, yet Sutherland pressed that false
doctrine.”) (emphasis added).
51. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (citation omitted).
52. See id. See also KOH, supra note 19, at 95 (“[w]hile accepting the notion that the president
should manage foreign policy—a tradition that had begun with Washington—the Curtiss-Wright
opinion rejected the attendant condition of congressional consultation and participation.”).
53. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
54. Id. at 582–83.
55. Id. at 586–88.
56. Id. at 585.
57. Id. at 58587.
58. Id. at 587.
59. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). See also KOH, supra note 19, at 108 (“Jackson’s
Youngstown concurrence squarely rejected the Curtiss-Wright vision.”).

156

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 70.1:1

1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate. In these circumstances, . . . may he be said (for what it
may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. . . .
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . .
. [C]ongressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may . . . enable,
if not invite, . . . independent presidential responsibility. . . .
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can
sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.60
Reasoning that Congress’ rejection of the amendment allowing President
Truman to seize steel mills meant his conduct was at odds with the will of
Congress, Justice Jackson placed President Truman’s authority “at its lowest
ebb” in this case, meaning he could only prevail under the framework with an
affirmative grant under the Constitution.61 Justice Jackson then rejected
arguments that the Article II vesting clause and the Commander in Chief clause
gave him this authority, lamenting of a broad reading of the Commander in Chief
power, “no doctrine . . . would seem . . . more sinister . . . than that a President
whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is
unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country
by his own commitment of the Nation’s armed forces.”62 Moreover, Justice
Jackson cited Congress’ authority under Article I “to raise and support Armies,”
and “to provide and maintain a Navy “ as evidence of Congress’ greater war
authority under the Constitution.63
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court applied Justice Jackson’s framework
to the question of whether the President could “block[] the removal or transfer
of ‘all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran,’” and
suspend claims against a foreign country through executive orders under the
Constitution.64 In its analysis, the majority remarked that presidential action is
not always as clear as Justice Jackson’s framework might indicate.65

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 63538 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 637, 63941 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 641–42 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Id. at 643 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661–62, 669 (1981).
Id. at 669.
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Nevertheless, the Court resolved the question of blocking property by explaining
that Congress authorized the President to thwart transfers by enacting the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”)—thus placing the
President’s action well within the Category One of the Steel Seizure
framework.66 Recognizing that no statute authorized the President to suspend
claims, the Court nevertheless refused to “ignore the general tenor of Congress’
legislation . . . in trying to determine whether the President is acting alone or at
least with the acceptance of Congress.”67 Given the President’s generous
authority under the statutes at issue, and “the history of congressional
acquiescence in executive claims settlement,” the Court held that the President
could suspend the claims.68
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court addressed whether the President possessed
authority to detain an American citizen when a statute provided that no citizen
could be detained “except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”69 Justice
O’Connor’s plurality opinion concluded that the Authorization for Use of
Military Force following the September 11, 2001 attacks was sufficient to permit
the President to detain a United States citizen.70
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court addressed whether a detainee held at
Guantanamo Bay, who the President declared was subject to trial by military
commission, was entitled to the protections of an act of Congress: The Uniform
Code of Military Justice.71 Though the Court recognized an independent power
of the President to call military commissions, citing Youngstown, it reasoned that
“he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its
own war powers, placed on his powers,” and held that the military commission

66. Id. at 670, 67275.
67. Id. at 678. Koh notes of Justice Rehnquist’s majority’s three-part scheme of statutory
construction,
[R]ather than constru[ing] IEEPA’s silence regarding the suspension of claims as
preempting the President’s claim of inherent power to act, [he] construed a history of
unchecked executive practice, the fact of IEEPA’s existence, and the absence of express
congressional disapproval of the President’s action to demonstrate that Congress had
implicitly authorized the act, thereby elevating the President’s power from the twilight
zone— Jackson’s category two— to its height in Jackson’s category one. By so holding,
he effectively followed the dissenting view in Youngstown, which had converted
legislative silence into consent, thereby delegating to the President authority that
Congress itself had arguably withheld.
KOH, supra note 19, at 139.
68. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 65556, 686 (“Past practice does not, by itself, create power,
but ‘long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption
that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent.’” (citations omitted)).
69. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 51519 (2004) (plurality opinion) remanded by 378
F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 2004), superseded by statute Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–
148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005) as stated in Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 50 (D.D.C. 2009).
70. Id.
71. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 56872 (2006).
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“lack[ed] power to proceed” because it did not comply with the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, among other applicable legal principles .72
Zivotosfky v. Kerry presented a situation where the President’s authority was
at its lowest ebb.73 The issue was whether a United States citizen born in
Jerusalem was entitled to have Israel listed as the place of birth on a passport
when an act of Congress provided that he was, but a State Department manual
reflecting the President’s position provided that he was not.74 In 2002, Congress
enacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which provides in pertinent
part that “for purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or
issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem,
the Secretary [of State] shall, . . . record the place of birth as Israel.”75 Though
he signed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, President Bush noted that he
considered this provision to infringe upon his constitutional powers, and that the
United States position on Jerusalem’s status did not change with the law.76
When President Truman recognized Israel in 1948, he did not consider
Jerusalem to be within Israel’s sovereignty.77 Indeed, this had remained the
position of each President since Truman’s recognition, and of the State
Department.78
Because the State Department’s practice of listing Jerusalem instead of Israel
on passports was in tension with the express will of Congress as embodied in the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, the majority in Zivotofsky “examine[d] the
Constitution’s text and structure, as well as precedent and history bearing on the
question.”79 Ultimately, the Court found that the President’s power to “receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers”—which was understood as amounting
to recognition power at the time of the Constitution—and which President
Washington employed to recognize the French Revolutionary government—was
an exclusive recognition power.80 In determining that this particular power was
exclusive, the Court fortified its conclusion with the premise in Curtiss-Wright
that the President alone could “make” treaties, and that diplomatic decisions and
relations were ill-suited for congressional oversight.81
72. Id. at 593 n.23, 613 (citation omitted).
73. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 10 (2015).
74. Id. at 57.
75. Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 78 (citation omitted).
77. Id. at 6 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 68 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 67, 10.
80. Id. at 11–12, 15–16 (“[T]he Reception Clause received little attention at the Constitutional
Convention . . . . In fact, during the ratification debates, Alexander Hamilton claimed that the power
to receive ambassadors was ‘more a matter of dignity than of authority,’ a ministerial duty largely
‘without consequence.’”) (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 1314, 17 (“A clear rule that the formal power to recognize a foreign government
subsists in the President therefore serves a necessary purpose in diplomatic relations.”). Despite
the majority opinion’s apparent dismissal of Curtiss-Wright as dictum, “taking the Zivotofsky II
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Despite concluding that recognition authority belonged to the President alone,
the Court rejected any assertion that the President had “exclusive authority to
conduct diplomatic relations,” and emphasized Congress’ role in foreign affairs,
simply noting that recognition is only one part of overall foreign affairs
authority.82 Nevertheless, the majority did not consider Congress’ naturalization
authority under the Constitution to bear on this issue.83
Although in Curtiss-Wright Justice Sutherland left open the possibility that a
delegation by Congress to the President could be unconstitutional if it concerned
domestic affairs,84 this has not remained the Supreme Court’s position.85 At
issue in Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., was whether
Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act was an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative authority to the President.86 Applying the intelligible principle test,
the Court rejected the non-delegation challenge because the statute
“establish[ed] clear preconditions to Presidential action, . . . the leeway that the
statute gives the President . . . is far from unbounded, . . . [and because the
statute] articulates a series of specific factors to be considered by the
President.”87

majority opinion as a whole, this disavowal doth protects too much. For much of the Court’s
holding on the recognition power is built implicitly—and at one point even explicitly—on this
broad language in Curtiss-Wright.” Jean Galbraith, Zivotofsky v. Kerry and the Balance of Power,
109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 16, 18 (2016).
82. Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 16, 1920 (“It remains true, of course, that many decisions
affecting foreign relations—including decisions that may determine the course of our relations with
recognized countries—require congressional action.”) (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 33 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Scalia explained, “Congress’s
power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ Art I, § 8, cl. 4, enables it to grant American
citizenship to someone born abroad. . . . [This] enables Congress to furnish the people it makes
citizens with papers verifying their citizenship—say a consular report of birth abroad.” Id. at 69
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936).
85. The modern standard is the “intelligible principle’ test,” providing that “[s]o long as
Congress ‘shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not
a forbidden delegation of legislative power.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989)
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). For a thorough
overview of the intelligible principle doctrine and its limits, see Bryan Clerk, Comment, Refining
the Nondelegation Doctrine in Light of Real ID Act Section 102(c): Time to Stop Bulldozing
Constitutional Barriers for a Border Fence, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 851, 857–68 (2009).
86. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 55859 (1976).
87. Id. at 55960. The provisions of a trade statute provided,
if the Secretary of the Treasury finds that an “article is being imported into the United
States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security,” the President is authorized to “take such action, and for such time, as he deems
necessary to adjust the imports of [the] article and its derivatives so that . . . imports [of
the article] will not threaten to impair the national security.
Id. at 550.
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C. Past Practice
1. The Iran-Contra Affair – A Warning for the Future
In 1986, a Lebanese newspaper revealed that the Reagan administration—
despite its statements to the contrary—had been selling arms to Iran in order to
encourage the government to assist with release of American hostages held in
Lebanon.88 Moreover, in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair, the
Reagan administration used the funds secured through these sales to support the
Contras in Nicaragua.89 This conduct likely implicates Justice Jackson’s
framework because Congress, through legislation in 1982 and the Boland
Amendment of 1984, barred the President from providing assistance to the
Contras.90
An emphasis on individual wrongdoing in the reports of the Tower
Commission, the House and Senate Select Committees and Independent
Counsel, or the bodies charged with investigating Iran-Contra, produced little if
any lessons for the future.91 While David J. Scheffer identified potential
unlawful aspects of the Iran-Contra Affair under the AECA, he nevertheless
concedes that the sales “fall[] into a legal quagmire because of the conflict

88. GORDON SILVERSTEIN, IMBALANCE OF
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

POWER: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
146 (1997).

89. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 146.
90. FISHER, supra note 36, at 21415.
91. See KOH, supra note 19, at 1123 (“That focus [on the Affair’s anomaly] led the [Tower]
Commissioners to reject the notion that the Iran-contra affair illustrated any need for legislative
reform.”). The Tower Commission Report “generally favored the presidency, even while laying
the blame for the affair at the door of a specific President.” KOH, supra note 19, at 16. The
committees also “virtually ignore[ed] the crucial legislative portion of their institutional mandate,”
KOH, supra note 19, at 16, and though the Majority affirmed Congress’ shared role in foreign
policy, it failed to “buttress[] its statements of constitutional principle with a comprehensive
legislative program,” and “proffered only scattered recommendations for structural reform of the
national security process.” KOH, supra note 19, at 2021. As for the independent counsel, while
it obtained a conviction for Oliver North, the case evolved into “an ordinary criminal prosecution,”
regarding, not foreign policy failures, but rather inquiries into “whether North has lied to Congress,
[and] altered documents.” KOH, supra note 19, at 23. Koh does seem to articulate one lesson for
the future in his statement that,
the Iran-contra affair was only the tip of a much larger iceberg that crystalized during the
Vietnam War. All of the congressional-executive struggles that surrounded the affair
merely replicated battles that transpired during the earlier period. That history should
have repeated itself across so many spheres of foreign affairs, even after Congress had
passed so many statutes to avoid repetition of the Vietnam-era evasions, suggests that the
Iran-contra affair exposed systemic, rather than localized, problems in the American
foreign-policy process.
KOH, supra note 19, at 62. If there is a lesson for the future, then, perhaps it is that Congress’
practice of delegation, and its failure to alter its practices after the Vietnam War and repeats such
as Iran-Contra shows that Congress deserves primary culpability for the emergency waiver
provision of the Arms Export Control Act.
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between the laws governing the export of military arms and the laws governing
cover activities.”92
D. The Arms Export Control Act’s Meaning and Requirements
Congress enacted the AECA’s predecessor, the Foreign Military Sales Act in
1968, in recognition of a “need for a consolidation and revision of the basic
authority for the U.S. Government to sell military equipment abroad.”93 As
Gordon Silverstein argues, the dawn of the Cold War and an era of nuclear
weapons marked a change in Congress’ approach to war powers; it chose to
delegate and “centralize authority.”94 The Foreign Military Sales Act’s
legislative
history
makes
clear
Congress’
“concern
that
a
large military sales program, unless it is carefully managed, may contribute to
the development of regional arms races.”95
While the initial Foreign Military Sales Act “required the Secretary of State
to report ‘significant’ arms sales semiannually to Congress,”96 Congress sought
to greatly expand its oversight powers through the 1974 Nelson-Bingham
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.97 As Silverstein and others
note, executive conduct and the Vietnam War prompted Congress to carve out a
place in several foreign policy arenas.98 This particular amendment likely
responded to President Nixon’s covert sale of weapons to the Shah of Iran in

92. David J. Scheffer, Current Development: U.S. Law and the Iran-Contra Affair, 81 AM. J.
INT’L L. 696, 698 (1987). As David J. Sheffer noted,
[C]urrent arms export . . . laws suffer from two glaring deficiencies. First, there is no
single standard in the law for (1) determining whether a state supports international
terrorism; (2) identifying which U.S. official should make that determination; (3)
identifying which arms are subject to restrictions; (4) identifying the criterial that
empower the President to waive statutory restrictions; and (5) informing Congress of
arms exports, including covert exports. The law is riddled with overlapping standards
that can lead to confusion and misuse.
Id. Although Scheffer identifies provisions of the AECA that the Affair likely violated, id. at
699707, what does it say about the Act’s meaning and validity that violations do not have
meaningful consequences? Was it even illegal under the AECA? See KOH, supra note 19, at 51
(questioning whether covert sales are in fact illegal if the President justifies covert arms sales by
using intelligence law frameworks).
93. S. REP. NO. 90-1632, at 4474 (1968).
94. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 123.
95. S. REP. NO. 90-1632, at 4474.
96. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFS., WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: A SPECIAL STUDY OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, at 257 (1982) [hereinafter War Powers Resolution].
97. The War Powers resolution became “the touchstone and model of other bills and
resolutions aimed at similarly perceived problems,” the AECA Act among them. War Powers
Resolution, supra note 96, at 255. Silverstein argues that the War Powers Resolution and
subsequent laws based on that model are fundamentally flawed because Congress gives away or
delegates its authority—even though it attempts to retain and restrict that authority—and in so
doing, suggests that the executive take the initiative. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 139.
98. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 125.
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1972, over objection of both the State and Defense Departments.99 Critically,
Congress began to associate arms with diplomacy and foreign affairs more so
than with trade, which also accounts for its renewed interest in the subject.100
Like the War Powers Resolution, the Nelson-Bingham Amendment required that
the Executive notify Congress before any proposed sale above a threshold
amount, and provide a sufficiently detailed report on proposed sales.101
Congress then possessed the authority under the Act to halt any such sales by
concurrent resolution.102
Congress attempted to pass more wide reaching legislation in the Ford
Administration in 1974, in order to expand its authority.103 Failing to muster
sufficient votes to override a presidential veto for an earlier version of the
AECA, Congress and the President eventually agreed on and passed a nowmodified AECA in 1976.104 Although Congress originally inserted seven
legislative veto provisions,105 the compromise eliminated most.106 Heralding
human rights as an “area[] of deep concern to all Americans,” President Ford
signed the bill despite his belief that the remaining concurrent resolution
provision was “constitutionally objectionable.”107
1. Legislative Veto and its Demise – Yet Another Wake-Up Call?
In INS v. Chadha, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a
legislative veto not adhering to the “step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative
process” of bicameralism and presentment in Article I § 7 of the United States
Constitution, was unconstitutional.108 In the wake of this decision, Congress
99. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons
of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1266 (1988) [hereinafter Why the President (Almost)
Always Wins].
100. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 164.
101. War Powers Resolution, supra note 96, at 257.
102. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins, supra note 99, at 1266.
103. Kevin P. Sheehan, Executive-Legislative Relations and the U.S. Arms Export Control
Regime In the Post-Cold War Era, 33 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 179, 192–94 (1995).
104. Gerald R. Ford, Statement, President Signs Security Assistance and Arms Export Control
Act (Jul. 1 1976), in LXXV THE DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 198, 198 (1986) [hereinafter Ford].
105. 122 CONG. REC. 14,434 (daily ed. May 19, 1976) (statement of Rep. Morgan).
106. Id.
107. Ford, supra note 104, at 198. Ford also stated, “My approval of H.R. 13680 will enable
us to go forward with important programs in the Middle East, in Africa, and elsewhere . . . aimed
at achieving our goal of international peace and stability.” Id. at 199.
108. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958–59 (1983). See also KOH, supra note 19, at 143
(“Chadha’s broadest impact in foreign affairs derives not from what it says the President may do,
but from what it implies Congress may not do.”). Koh argues that with respect to trade, Chadha
did not diminish Congress’ role. Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential
Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1191, 1233 (1986)
(“[R]eports of the death of Congress’ role in international trade policymaking after Chadha have
been greatly exaggerated. If anything, the demise of the legislative veto has breathed new life into
Congress’ determination to claim an active role in trade matters . . . .”). Contra Timothy Meyer &
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amended the AECA by replacing concurrent resolutions with joint resolutions,
or the usual process of bicameralism and presentment.109 Though he notes that
Congress has rarely invoked a joint resolution to prevent arms sales, Silverstein
credits Congress with some success in oversight—reasoning that the legislative
veto, and the prospect of a joint resolution after Chadha—send a message to the
President to proceed with more caution in this arena.110 One interesting case
study is President Reagan’s attempt to sell arms to none other than Saudi Arabia
in 1986.111 After a majority in both houses of Congress voted in a joint
resolution to prevent arms sales, the President modified the agreement to
convince enough senators to sustain his presidential veto by only one vote.112
E. The Modern Law
The current version of the AECA delegates to the President the ability to
“control the import and the export of defense articles.”113 The Act permits such
arms sales, transfers and leases “solely” for enumerated purposes such as:
[I]nternal security, . . . legitimate self-defense, for preventing . . . the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . . permit the recipient country to
participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures . . . requested by
the United Nations for . . . international peace and security, or for . . . enabling
foreign military forces in less developed . . . countries to . . . engage in other
activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly
countries.114
F. 22 U.S.C. § 2776 – Requirements or Suggestions?
22 U.S.C. § 2776 sets out the President’s reporting and consultation
requirements with Congress under the AECA.115 In addition to providing
periodic unclassified reports concerning letters of offer for defense
equipment,116 the President must submit certifications to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate detailing the circumstances of a sale, either in the form of a
government-to-government transfer or a commercial transfer in which case the
Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107 CAL. L. REV. 583, 610 (2019)
(rejecting Koh’s premise because the reforms that replaced the legislative veto diminished
Congress’ influence).
109. 132 CONG. REC. E3,175-03 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1986) (statement of Rep. Levine).
110. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 153.
111. Vanessa Patton Sciarra, Note, Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the
Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure, 97 YALE L.J. 1439, 1448 (1988).
112. Id.
113. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2018).
114. 22 U.S.C. § 2754 (2018).
115. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776 (2018).
116. See § 2776(a).
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President issues a license to private companies.117 However, the President may
waive waiting periods in which Congress has an opportunity to issue a joint
resolution of disapproval to halt arms sales if he certifies that “an emergency
exists.”118
II. ANALYSIS
Saudi Arabia’s worsening reputation beginning with the Saudi-led Coalition’s
record at home and in Yemen,119 and culminating in Jamal Khashoggi’s
murder,120 seems to show that Congress taking a stand on arms sales with respect
to Saudi Arabia is not beyond the realm of possibility.121 If enough members of
Congress are persuaded to override a presidential veto, could the President still
engage in the sales?

117. See § 2776(c)(1).
118. 22 U.S.C. § 2776. The waiver relevant to this dispute provides that the President must
report to Congress unless he certifies that “an emergency exists which requires the proposed export
in the national security interests of the United States.” § 2776(c)(2). The President must also
provide a “detailed justification . . . including a description of the emergency circumstances.” Id.
The emergency provisions of the AECA originated as a product of negotiations between the Ford
administration and Congress in 1974. Christopher M. Blanchard, Jeremy M. Sharp & Clayton
Thomas, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 7-5700, MEMORANDUM: EMERGENCY ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE
EAST: CONTEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 9–10 (2019). Citing concerns around how delays
could affect relations with allies, President Ford rejected a proposal that would have allowed him
to proceed with a sale for thirty days before seeking Congress’ approval—arguing the October
1973 war as an example of a situation where—if enemies knew the United States would stop
providing arms after thirty days—the war might have escalated. Id. (noting that Ford
mischaracterized the thirty-day waiting period as it would not have resulted in an immediate and
indefinite halt to sales).
119. Newton, supra note 3, at 11. See also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SAUDI ARABIA 2018
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT
2 (2018), https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/SAUDI-ARABIA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOMREPORT.pdf (“Since 2004, Saudi Arabia has been designated as a ‘Country of Particular Concern’
(CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated
particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”).
120. In October of 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist who wrote for the Washington
Post, was assassinated in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey. Bill Hutchinson, Timeline of the
Disappearance and Killing of Journalist Jamal Khashoggi, ABC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2018 9:59 AM),
https://abcnews.go.com/International/timeline-disappearance-journalist-jamalkhashoggi/story?id=58505659. See also CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45046, CONGRESS AND THE WAR
IN YEMEN, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing a senate resolution from December 2018 proclaiming
that it was the sense of the Senate that the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, had ordered
the killing).
121. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., CONGRESS AND THE WAR IN YEMEN, supra note 14, at 2–8
(noting that when the coalition first emerged, providing arms was not controversial, and tracking
the growing opposition to United States involvement in general, eventually culminating with the
passage of a resolution consistent with the War Powers Resolution).
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A. The President’s Argument
In suggesting that the President does possess authority to sell arms over
Congress’ objection, advocates for a broad executive power might approach this
question by arguing first that as in Dames & Moore and Hamdi, such action
might not actually be the President at his lowest ebb under Justice Jackson’s
Steel Seizure framework.122 Next, advocates might contend that even if the
President is at his lowest ebb, the affirmative grants to the President under the
Constitution would allow him to prevail. A third argument might involve past
practice.
Advocates of a strong executive authority in foreign affairs would first look
to the reasoning the United States Supreme Court in Dames & Moore, where the
Court understood “the general tenor of Congress’ legislation” to authorize the
President’s conduct though no statute expressly allowed it, thus shifting his
status from a zone of twilight to his authority at its strongest.123 Advocates could
also point to Hamdi, where O’Connor’s plurality reasoned that the AUMF
allowed the President to ignore a statute that seemingly prevented his conduct
as a further example of flexibility in Justice Jackson’s framework.124 Although
in this case the AECA refuses to allow the President to sell arms if Congress
passes a joint resolution preventing him,125 the President might suggest that the
overall intent of the statute is to allow the President wide latitude because it is a
delegation of the authority to control the sale of arms, and because of the
emergency waiver provisions.126 Alternatively, he could contend that, pursuant
to Hamdi, there is an unrelated congressional act that authorizes it.127 Not only
is the President given the authority to take the initiative by arranging sales under
the AECA, which only requires that he report and wait for Congress to approve
them, the President also has the ability to waive these requirements by declaring
that an emergency exists.128

122. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38. (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
123. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981).
124. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517–19 (2004) (plurality opinion). For a critique of
O’Connor’s reasoning, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Wartime Security and Constitutional Liberty:
Hamdi Meets Youngstown: Justice Jackson’s Wartime Security Jurisprudence And The Detention
Of “Enemy Combatants”, 68 ALBANY L. REV. 1127, 1139 (2005) (“O’Connor’s preference for
seeking congressional authorization . . . rather than deriving the authority from the President’s
constitutional powers under Article II, is facially consistent with Jackson’s approach. . . . O’Connor
failed to demand . . . clear congressional authorization that Jackson . . . required. Her conclusion
that the Court should broadly infer congressional approval . . . was contrary to Jackson’s . . .
application . . . .”).
125. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(1) (2018).
126. See id. (requiring the President to report to Congress about sales, suggesting he conduct
negotiations regarding sales).
127. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 51719 (2004) (plurality opinion). An analysis of other statutes
potentially supplying authority is beyond the scope of this comment.
128. One of these provisions provides:
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In addition to the AECA itself, the President could point to the many foreign
affairs statutes which also delegate Congress’ authority to the President, and
suggest that, in aggregate, these statutes evince a “general tenor” of approval to
executive action in the foreign affairs arena.129 Thus, the President’s authority
is not in Category Three under Justice Jackson’s framework, but Category Two;
and this zone of twilight is “likely to depend on the imperatives of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”130
Even if the President were to concede that selling arms to Saudi Arabia over
congressional opposition would place his authority “at is lowest ebb” under
Justice Jackson’s framework, the President could argue that he should prevail
because of his affirmative grants under the Constitution.131 The President will
first explain that Article II’s vesting clause, because it vests him with “the
executive Power”132 as opposed to “all legislative Powers herein granted”
inherently bestows to him more authority than Congress.133 Next, the President
will argue that his Commander in Chief power of Article II supplies the authority
to conduct arms sales because it concerns the realm of war, and these are arms
sales to be used in war.134
In the alternative, the President would contend that arms sales are now
understood as mechanisms of diplomacy and treaty-like as opposed to trade and
commerce.135 Under Curtiss-Wright, the President has greater authority in the
realm of treaties than does Congress because he “makes” or negotiates them, a
process over which Congress has no control.136 The President might also
suggest that Congress’ authority is even less significant given the proliferation
of executive agreements to which the United States is a party.137 As of 2008 the
State Department provided data stating that the United States had entered into

If the President states in his certification that an emergency exists which requires the
proposed export in the national security interests of the United States, thus waiving the
requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, he shall set forth in the
certification a detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the
emergency circumstances which necessitate the immediate issuance of the export license
and a discussion of the national security interests involved.
See, e.g., § 2776(c). For a discussion of ambiguity or a possible drafting error in this provision of
the AECA, see CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10304, WAIVER OF CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION
PERIOD IN THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT 14 (2019).
129. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981); see SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at
123.
130. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 63438 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
131. Id.
132. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
134. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 1.
135. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 159.
136. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
137. Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note 15, at 149.
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nearly 200 executive agreements with other nations, some with no congressional
approval.138
The President might also justify his conduct based on the Reception Clause.139
As discussed in Zivotofsky and Curtiss-Wright, the President does possess
considerable authority in diplomatic affairs because they often involve
negotiation.140 Given that it was a dispute around the President’s authority over
arms sales that convinced the Court in Curtiss-Wright to affirm the President as
the “sole organ . . . in its external relations,” such autonomy extends to arms
sales.141
Last, the President might argue that past practice indicates he possesses
authority to engage in arms sales over Congress’ opposition. In addition to the
tradition of sole executive agreements, the President could summon the IranContra Affair as an example of where the President both sold arms covertly—
without following the AECA’s directives—and avoided an act of Congress that
sought to prevent the President from aiding the Contras.142
B. Congress’ Argument
Advocates for a more restrained view of executive authority, or Congress,
would argue that the imagined scenario is well within the Category Three of
Justice Jackson’s framework, that the President must then have an affirmative
grant from the Constitution minus any authority that Congress possesses, and
that he does not.143 Nevertheless, the emergency waiver provisions, and the
strong statements in Curtiss-Wright are a quandary, and not susceptible to easy
answers.
Congress would first contend that the President proceeding with arms sales
over congressional opposition falls well within Justice Jackson’s Category
Three.144 Unlike the case of Dames & Moore, where there was no express bar

138. Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note 15, at 14950.
139. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
140. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 17 (2015); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.
141. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–21 (citation omitted). The President might suggest
affirmative grants under the Constitution are less important or even immaterial when Congress has
delegated the authority through the AECA. See Fisher, The Staying Power, supra note 49, at 165–
66 (“[Curtiss-Wright] itself did not concern independent or plenary presidential power. . . . [but]
whether Congress had delegated legislative authority too broadly when it authorized the President
to declare an arms embargo on South America. . . . In imposing the embargo, President . . .
Roosevelt relied solely on statutory—not inherent executive—authority.”) (emphasis added).
Indeed, it is very challenging for Congress to complain about executive action that it enabled.
142. FISHER, supra note 36, at 21415. Because this was not the first time a President had sold
arms covertly, could the President argue the commissions’ failure to introduce meaningful changes
operates as a waiver?
143. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
144. Id. at 63738 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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against the President’s conduct in some act of Congress,145 the AECA makes
clear that the President may not proceed with the sale “if the Congress, within
that [waiting] period, enacts a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed
export.”146 Therefore, the “general tenor” of statutes in the foreign affairs arena
are unnecessary to resolve the dispute because the AECA supplies a clear
answer.147 With respect to the President’s argument that the existence of waivers
suggests that the President was meant to have discretion under the AECA, the
legislative history makes clear Congress’ intent that it also speak in arms
sales.148
Having established that this situation would render the President’s authority
at its lowest ebb, Congress would argue that the President lacks authority to sell
arms over Congress’ objection because Congress alone possesses it under the
plain language of the Constitution.149 Here, Congress will point to the plain
language of Article I, which grants it authority to “regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations,” making clear that Congress, and only Congress, has the power
to regulate the sale of arms.150 According to Chief Justice Marshall, this power
“relates to commerce, in the proper acceptation of the term: ‘the exchange of
one thing for another; the interchange of commodities; trade or traffic.’”151 As
arms are commodities and the AECA provides regulations for their exchange,
the clause applies.152 Thus, the President in this case, like President Truman in
Youngstown, would not prevail at the lowest ebb.153
Despite the President’s argument that Iran-Contra shows he possesses
authority to sell arms over Congress’ objection, there is other evidence
suggesting the President and Congress have both thought that the AECA’s
requirements are binding. One example is President Reagan’s efforts to sell
weapons to Saudi Arabia in 1986.154 In this circumstance, President Reagan
knew that Congress opposed the sale, and he made concessions in order to sway
enough votes to sustain his veto.155 Why would he have gone to the trouble if
the law meant nothing? Another instance of arms sales to Saudi Arabia
145. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 681–82 (1981).
146. 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c)(2)(A) (2018).
147. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678.
148. See War Powers Resolution, supra note 96, at 257–58 (quoting S. Rep 94-605) (noting
how the War Powers Resolution also influenced other legislation that placed checks and balances
on presidential authority). As Harold Koh notes, “[t]he vast majority of the foreign affairs powers
the President exercises daily are not inherent constitutional powers, but rather, powers that
Congress has expressly or implicitly delegated to him by statute.” KOH, supra note 19, at 45.
149. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
150. Id.
151. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 115 (1824).
152. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c) (2018).
153. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633–34 (1954); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 63738 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
154. Sciarra, supra note 111, at 1448.
155. Id.
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illustrates the binding power of the AECA’s reporting and waiting period
provisions.156 Two years earlier, in 1984, President Reagan reported to Congress
a proposed sale in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war.157 After it seemed clear
Congress would oppose the sale, President Reagan withdrew his proposal and
invoked an emergency waiver provision instead.158 Again, it makes little logical
sense for a President to follow a law if he or she believes that it is not binding.
C. The Troubling Presence of the Emergency Waiver Provisions
The emergency waiver provisions in § 2776 of the AECA complicate the
analysis. Because the legislative history seems to make clear that the executive
should have broad discretion under the emergency clauses, the President could
argue that the “general tenor” of the AECA itself is to offer him wide
discretion.159 Although President Reagan’s move to inform Congress of a sale
pursuant to a non-emergency, and then invoke an emergency when Congress
disapproved, suggests he thought the non-emergency requirements of the AECA
did bind him at some level,160 this episode also illustrates that requirements are
effectively meaningless if the President can discharge them by declaring an
emergency. More important, are there any limits?
Under the Steel Seizure analysis then, could the President’s conduct ever
reside in Category Three if he invokes the emergency provision?161 Even if
Congress attempted to pass a law specifically prohibiting his sale, is the
President not acting pursuant to the emergency waiver provision, which allows
him to ignore Congress in the case of an emergency?
III. COMMENT – TIME TO RECONSIDER CURTISS-WRIGHT?
According to UNICEF, “Yemen is the largest humanitarian crisis in the world,
with more than 24 million people—some 80 per cent of the population—in need
of humanitarian assistance, including more than 12 million children.”162 Famine
conditions and an outbreak of cholera also contribute to the suffering of the
Yemeni people.163 Experts in a recent United Nations Human Rights Council
report cite a number of airstrikes the Saudi-led Coalition undertook that killed
civilians—among them—the August 2018 strike on a bus in Sa’dah, a March
2019 attack on a busy hospital that killed eight civilians, and four airstrikes in
156. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c) (2018).
157. Blanchard, Sharp & Thomas, supra note 118, at 13.
158. Id.
159. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981); § 2776(b)(1).
160. Blanchard, Sharp & Thomas, supra note 118, at 1314.
161. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 63738 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
162. Yemen Crisis, UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/yemen-crisis (last visited
Oct. 26, 2019).
163. Human Rights Council, supra note 2, at 175–76 (“In March 2019, the World Food
Programme (WFP) declared Yemen ‘the world’s largest food crisis.’”) (citation omitted).
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Al-Hundaydah that resulted in deaths and injuries.164 Based on the results of
these airstrikes, the experts concluded this pattern of attack might not comport
with international humanitarian law.165
In his report for the American Bar Association, Newton concludes that,
assuming human rights reports are reasonably accurate, there is sufficient
evidence to suggest that “the government of Saudi Arabia has engaged in a
consistent pattern of gross human rights violations in Saudi Arabia[,]”166 and
“prima facie evidence of [a] consistent pattern of flagrant denials of the right to
life, namely, serious violations of the prohibition on indiscriminate or
disproportionate acts.”167
Should Congress seek to halt arms sales under the AECA, and garner enough
support to override a presidential veto, the President should not then be able to
proceed with the sale. By the same token, Congress should not possess
unlimited authority to halt or execute arms sales either. This view is fully
consistent with the plain language of the Constitution and Justice Jackson’s Steel
Seizure Framework. The particular case of Yemen illustrates the importance of
arms sales, and many related policy decisions. One branch possessing authority
to circumvent another sets a dangerous precedent. Unfortunately, the emergency
waiver provisions of the AECA, together with the dictum in Curtiss-Wright
make this result less certain.
Unlike in Curtiss-Wright and Dames & Moore, the AECA would likely bar
the President from proceeding with a sale in the absence of an emergency.168
Although the President’s conduct seemed to be at odds with the statute in Hamdi,
Justice O’Connor’s plurality reasoned that the AUMF, another act of Congress,
authorized it.169 Not only is there not another act of Congress present in this
case, but also the United States is not a member in the Saudi-led coalition.170 It

164. Id. at 107–11.
165. Id. at 111–12.
166. Newton, supra note 3, at 9–11 (noting that The U.S. Department of State has routinely
included in human rights reports accounts of torture, and prolonged arbitrary detention). See also
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SAUDI ARABIA 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 2
(2018)
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/SAUDI-ARABIA-2018INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf (“Since 2004, Saudi Arabia has been
designated as a ‘Country of Particular Concern’ (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998.”).
167. Newton, supra note 3, at 13, 19 (explaining that indiscriminate attacks are violations of
international humanitarian law).
168. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c)(2) (2018).
169. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 517, 517 (2004) (plurality opinion).
170. As previously discussed, analysis of other statutes that might provide authority for the
President is beyond the scope of this comment. For a list of coalition members, see Reuters, Which
Counties are Part of Saudi Arabia’s Coalition Against Yemen’s Houthis?, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 26, 2015, 7:21 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/saudi-coalition-yemen_n_6946092.
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is therefore conduct “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress,” and in Category Three under Justice Jackson’s framework.171
As a result of disastrous commercial transactions between the states and
foreign nations under the Articles of Confederation, “there was widespread
agreement that Congress should regulate at least some aspects of foreign
commerce.”172 Indeed, the framers did just that, granting Congress the authority
“to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”173 Under Chief Justice
Marshall’s definition of commerce as an “interchange of commodities,” sales of
arms for money likely qualifies.174 There is no doubt that the President has
authority in both the treaty clause and the recognition clause to conduct
diplomacy.175 It is also true that arms sales are a mechanism of diplomacy and
war, an identity they arguably assumed rather recently.176 Like many
constitutional issues, perhaps the answer is that arms sales fall into a number of
categories.
Even if the President were to cast these sales as within his Commander in
Chief power, Youngstown suggests that the Commander in Chief power does
not confer universal authority because Truman was a wartime President and the
Court still managed to find that he did not possess authority to seize the steel
mills.177 Likewise, in Hamdan, the President’s constitutional authority did not
permit him to deny rights to a detainee when an act of Congress demanded it.178
Even if arms sales are more akin to foreign affairs than commerce, Congress
also has significant authority “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Capture on Land and Water[,]”179 “[t]o
raise and support Armies,”180 “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,”181 “[t]o make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”182 and
“[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to . . . suppress Insurrections and repel

171. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
172. Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 379, 413 (2000).
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
174. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 189 (1824).
175. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
176. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 157.
177. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
178. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 613 (2006).
[W]e do not today address, the Government’s power to detain him for the duration of
active hostilities in order to prevent such harm. But in undertaking to try Hamdan and
subject him to criminal punishment, the Executive is bound to comply with the rule of
law that prevails in this jurisdiction.
Id. at 635. (emphasis added).
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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Invasions.”183 Because the United Nations and Newton suggest Saudi Arabia
may not have complied with international humanitarian law, Congress’ authority
to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations” is highly relevant
in this case.184 Moreover, if the President benefits from inherent authority
through his Commander in Chief or vesting power, Justice Jackson’s framework
would be meaningless. Under Justice Jackson’s framework then, it seems likely
that the President would not possess authority to sell arms over Congress’
opposition.
The analysis presented above considers the requirements of the AECA in the
absence of an emergency waiver, and in many respects, Curtiss-Wright. The
existence of these emergency waivers—together with their broad
interpretation—complicate the analysis under Justice Jackson’s framework.185
Because they are interpreted so broadly,186 they both suggest that Congress
intended to give the President wide latitude and deference, and also essentially
make optional the requirements of the AECA.187 After all, President Reagan
invoked the waiver after it seemed clear Congress would oppose his arms sale.188
A proposed solution would be for courts to construe this emergency waiver
provision more strictly because any other interpretation might be an
unconstitutional delegation. Unlike the statute at issue in Algonquin, the
emergency waiver provision here depends on the President’s own determination,

183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
184. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. See supra note 166–167 and accompanying text.
185. See Blanchard, Sharp & Thomas, supra note 118, at 11–12 (discussing President Carter’s
1979 use of the emergency waiver provision in which he sold arms to North Yemen—paid for by
Saudi Arabia—in an effort to counter Soviet and Iranian influence after Southern Yemen gained
independence and established a socialist government).
186. See id. at 15–16. On August 26, 1990, President Bush notified Congress pursuant to the
terms of the emergency waiver provision that an emergency existed, and that the United States
needed to sell weapons to Saudi Arabia after Iraq invaded Kuwait and placed troops on Saudi
Arabia’s border. Id. at 15–16.
187. But see Estreicher & Menashi, supra note 18, at 1239 (“President Obama invoked the
various waiver provisions—some of which explicitly must be applied ‘on a case by case basis’ and
all of which are time-limited—effectively to repeal seventeen different sanctions [on Iran] . . . .”
(citations omitted)). Estreicher and Menashi question this conduct as it relates to Youngstown,
explaining, “[i]t would be difficult to argue that such an action is compatible ‘with the expressed
or implied will of Congress’ so as to be consistent with the Steel Seizure principle.” Id. In the
absence of analogous time limits and other meaningful restrictions imposed in the AECA’s waiver
provisions, it is possible to distinguish President Obama’s conduct as it relates to the Iran Nuclear
Agreement from the present situation. Nevertheless, perhaps what Estreicher and Menashi suggest
is that Congress—despite including a waiver which enables the President to escape its
requirements—can still articulate some intent and will. Given the proliferation of “delegation[s]
of a unilateral power to negate the legal force or effect of statutory text,” in many arenas such as
environmental law, immigration, trade, and foreign affairs, this seems a reasonable proposition. R.
Craig Kitchen, Negative Lawmaking Delegations: Constitutional Structure and Delegations to the
Executive of Discretionary Authority to Amend, Waive, and Cancel Statutory Text, 40 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 525, 528–29 (2013).
188. Blanchard, Sharp & Thomas, supra note 118, at 13–14.
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and not on that of “clear preconditions,” meaning that the President is free to
proceed with a sale as long as he provides a justification, and there are no factors
or definitions to guide the President’s determination that an emergency exists.189
While advocates for the President may point to guiding purposes articulated in
the AECA as sufficient to constitute an intelligible principle, there should be
cause for concern from a non-delegation perspective that, unlike in Algonquin,
there appear to be no limits on the President’s ability to declare anything an
emergency.190 In fact, this very scenario bears a resemblance to Justice
Jackson’s fears about the “sinister” prospect of a President invoking the
Commander in Chief power in order to extend his authority.191
As discussed in Section II, despite the Court in Zivotofsky’s protests that many
of the statements about executive authority made in Curtiss-Wright were mere
dicta, it does seem clear that Curtiss-Wright influenced the Court’s holding.192
Curtiss-Wright was also an appeal from a criminal conviction, meaning the
Court allowed Congress to delegate to the President authority to make and
enforce a criminal law.193 This proposition seems highly problematic from a
constitutional perspective.194 Not only does Curtiss-Wright appear contrary to
the framer’s intent to separate foreign affairs powers by dividing them among
the executive and legislative branches, it would also seem to preclude the
holding in Youngstown because President Truman justified his conduct based on

189. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 558–60 (1976).
190. Id. In Gundy v. United States, a plurality of justices affirmed the intelligible principle
test, and held that portions of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) at issue
in the case passed the test. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (plurality opinion).
However, in his concurrence, Justice Alito made clear his willingness to revisit the intelligible
principle approach should a majority of justices wish to do so. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (plurality
opinion) (Alito, J., concurring). Three justices in dissent questioned the intelligible principle test
itself, and labeled the statute at issue in the case, “delegation running riot.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at
2140–48 (plurality opinion) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). See Aditya Bamzai, The
Supreme Court 2018 Term: Comment: Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and
the Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 167 (2019) (“Gundy
addressed a fundamental disagreement between plurality and dissent on how to operationalize
nondelegation as a matter of constitutional doctrine. All of the Justices agreed that Article I
prohibited the delegation of ‘legislative Power’ to administrative agencies, but they disagreed on
where to draw the line.”).
191. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
192. See Galbraith, supra note 81, at 18–19.
193. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 314–15 (1936).
194. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587 (“[T]he President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the
lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks
bad.”) (emphasis added). See generally Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive
Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 750 (2003) (describing William Blackstone’s contention that
“executive power is the power to execute the laws,” and that “combining the legislative and
executive powers would result in tyranny because tyrannical legislation would more likely be
followed by tyrannical law execution.” (citations omitted)).
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war powers.195 Given the Constitution and Justice Jackson’s framework’s
endurance, Curtiss-Wright’s dubious contentions likely deserve further scrutiny.
Not only would a result that the President lacks the authority to disregard a
joint resolution opposing arms sales be consistent with the Constitution and
Justice Jackson’s framework, it is good policy.
Leaving aside the
unconscionable suffering of the Yemeni people to which the United States
contributes, deals between the executive or Congress alone are often less
advantageous because there is no pressure to secure a better deal, and negotiating
partners are well aware if a branch is not accountable to others.196 In this
particular case, as Newton warns, there is “cause for concern that the United
States’ ongoing support of the Saudi-led coalition may provoke more violent
extremism in the long term in light of the highly questionable patterns of attacks
affecting the civilian population.”197 This problem of rash decision-making
evincing questionable results is not new.198 Arms sales are only part of the larger
foreign policy framework, but they matter. Arms sales matter to the parents who
lost their children in the August 2018 airstrike.199 They should not be the domain
of one unaccountable branch.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the strong language of the AECA, it is hard to understand why time and
time again, the United States seems to supply arms that cause suffering to
civilians. While it is easy to blame the President in the case of a covert arms
sale, Congress is equally culpable for delegating authority in the first instance,
and declining to reign in the President’s conduct once it lost use of a legislative
veto not subject to the presidential veto.200 At the same time, maybe Congress
believes that the President should have discretion to act quickly on arms sales
given the complex and evolving nature of foreign affairs matters. Perhaps courts

195. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582–83. On the other hand, where Curtiss-Wright obviously
involves foreign affairs, perhaps Youngstown really does concern domestic affairs, despite the fact
that President Truman sought to justify his conduct based on foreign affairs powers.
196. Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note 15, at 147 (“[I]f the executive branch is free to
negotiate the best arrangement it can, it may be unable to make any position stick and may end by
conceding controversial points because its partners know, or believe obstinately, that the United
States would rather concede than terminate the negotiations.” (internal citations omitted)). See also
Louis Fisher, Presidential Residual Power in Foreign Affairs, 47 CAP. U. L. REV. 491, 526–27
(2019) (questioning the wisdom of more executive authority since Truman, and discussing the risks
of one entity making all decisions).
197. Newton, supra note 3, at 22.
198. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins, supra note 99, at 1319 (“As the IranContra Affair revealed, secretive unilateral executive decisionmaking guarantees neither wise nor
efficient foreign policymaking.”).
199. Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Ryan Browne, Barbara Arvanitidis & Laura SmithSpark, Bomb that Killed 40 Children in Yemen was Supplied by the US, CNN (Aug. 17, 2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/17/middleeast/us-saudi-yemen-bus-strike-intl/index.html.
200. Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note 15, at 168.
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should undertake their duty of impartial judicial review. Arms sales are not
merely diplomatic tools. They have consequences, as the present conflict in
Yemen demonstrates. Justice Jackson’s framework is a clear mechanism for
resolving conflicts between the President and Congress, and the Courts should
employ it more in the interest of the Constitution, national security, and
humanity.
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